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Supermarkets, which for so many years have been
able to do no wrong, now show all the signs of a ma
ture industry with all that that implies. The era of
management improvement may now be needed —

FOOD RETAILING NEEDS A
SYSTEMS APPROACH
by Harold W. Fox
DePaul University

is marked by ease of
60 per cent! The field with the larg
entry, deceptive simplicity of
est absolute decline is food stores.
operation, and high frequency of Fewer and bigger stores—this has
been the structural change in the
failure. The American dream of in
dependence and income still lures
food trade. But ever since super
thousands every week into starting
markets revolutionized food re
a small store—much as staking out
tailing, their average operating ex
a farm did in the last century. But
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one-half of the modem new ven
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manufacturers. Ultimately, the in
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other disposal. From manufacturing
time, the population has increased
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interrelated. Some of these prob
lems are under study by progressive
industry associations and compa
nies. Meantime, retailers are devis
ing imaginative ways to cope with
mounting challenges.
Food stores—fewer and bigger

Between 1939 and 1967, the
number of food stores—as reported
by the U.S. Census of Businessdropped from 560,000 to 294,000.
An estimate for mid-1972 is 265,000
establishments, of which 200,000
are grocery stores. Total sales of all
food stores are expected to reach
nearly $100 billion in 1972.
Almost one-half of all food stores
either lack paid employees or sell
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less than $50,000 annually. Many of
these small operations are a form of
disguised unemployment. At the
other extreme are 25,400 supermar
kets (included in the grocery total
above). These are departmentalized
food stores featuring fully selfservice grocery, dairy, meat, and
other sections, mass displays of
wide merchandise assortments, rel
atively low prices, and heavy ad
vertising. Most avoid such typically
department-store and specialty
store services as telephone orders,
home deliveries, credit, and gift
wrapping. The checkout counters
of these supermarkets register an
nual sales of at least $1 million.
Scholars have traced the concept
of supermarkets back to the Provi
dence Public Market in 1887, fol
lowed by other, separate attempts
elsewhere in prosperous 1910,
1916, 1925, and 1928. The industry
usually credits Michael Cullen as
the first successful supermarket op
erator. In 1930, after both Kroger
and A & P had rejected Cullen’s
idea, he opened “King Kullen, the
Price Wrecker” supermarkets in
Long Island, New York—and retail
ing entered a new era. Three dec
ades later, the supermarket concept
dominated the food trade. Since
then, the pace of further encroach
ment has been slow.
From a multitude of small shops
with salesclerks the food trade
changed to fewer, huge, strategic
ally located, self-service marts.
What are some of the economic,
commercial, psychological, physi
cal, financial, political, and social
forces that helped spark and sustain
this movement? The Great Depres
sion had made the public acutely
price-conscious. Shoppers accepted
manufacturers’ brands wherever
sold. Economies of scale in retailing
enabled the early supermarkets to
offer dramatic bargains. Spreading
ownership of automobiles and elec
tric refrigerators made household
buying in larger quantities feasible.
An unwitting spur to consolidation
was a progressive franchise tax on
each store of a chain, enacted in
some states during the 1930s. After
World War II, the growth of sub
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urbs and the construction of shop
ping centers were conducive to
high-volume operations.
From a commercial point of view
the supermarket business holds
three major attractions:

1. Revenues are likely to exceed
costs at least slightly, and the ex
tremely high turnover produces
a very good return on investment.
2. Foods are a basic necessity
with a permanent, continuously
rising demand.
3. Sellers of general merchandise
who operate supermarket de
partments can divert some of that
heavy traffic to adjacent areas
where sales are more profitable.
Foods are the core volume for
any kind of convenience-goods
business.

Supermarkets have gently falling
marginal costs, but optimum store
size is largely a matter of trading
area. Space in new units stabilized
at 20,000 square feet during the
mid-’60s. Currently, a trend to
ward giant stores exceeding 25,000
square feet is emerging. Slightly
over two-thirds is selling area.
Accounting for 10 per cent of
America’s food stores, supermarkets
handle 61 per cent of the sales. In
the immediate future the relative
importance of supermarkets is ex
pected to remain near present
levels.

The problems of maturity

The number of supermarkets is
still growing slightly, but there are
indications that in many areas,
"overstoring” is a problem. Among
the new supermarkets, two visible
trends are: (1) relatively more
units with higher sales and (2) rel
atively more units as adjuncts to
general-merchandise stores. Super
markets in the top sales category
—$5 million to $15 million—can cap
ture new efficiencies such as more
direct shipments from manufactur
ers into the store. Combination
stores offer consumers the con
venience of one-stop shopping.

The supermarket industry now is
mature, if not overextended. Many
companies are diversifying. This is
consistent with expected strategy at
the maturity stage of an industry’s
life cycle. Another manifestation of
maturity is emphasis on efficiency
because expansion of sales is more
difficult. In general, operating sav
ings of $100,000 have the same
impact on pretax profit as a $6¼
million rise in sales. The super
market manager is often required
to trade off one against the other.
Depersonalizing mechanization of
operations or curtailment of serv
ices can reduce sales drastically.
The present incidence of one
supermarket per 2,560 households
is not low. If food volume were
concentrated in fewer stores, prices
could be lower, but at reduced
accessibility and choice for some
consumers. Apparently, only a rad
ical innovation that consumers pre
fer because of lower cost or per
haps greater convenience is likely
to decrease the number of super
markets. Fixed costs are an ex
tremely low 7-8 per cent of sales,
a McKinsey-General Foods study
found. “In a large operation, a
store’s volume must shrink to very
low levels before shutting it down
makes financial sense,” the study
stated.
Beyond a minimum of competi
tors necessary to spur efficiency, the
more stores there are to divide the
demand for food which exists at
any one time, the higher each unit’s
cost of operation. Since super
markets are wedded to traditional
markup policies, higher operating
costs lead to higher gross margins
and higher prices.1 Rising gross
margins symbolize a key problem
of maturity in food retailing.
Total costs rising

The total cost of supermarket
operation, measured by gross mar
gin, has been climbing relentlessly
1A technical explanation is in Edward
H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopo
listic Competition, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1935, pp. 105106.
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EXHIBIT I
Common Size Operating Statement of a Supermarket For the Year 1971
Sales ($2½ million median)

100.0%

Cost of goods sold

78.7

Gross margin

21.3%

Warehousing, distribution, and headquarters overhead

Store expenses:
Labor and benefits
Advertising, stamps
Supplies
Real estate
Utilities and misc.
Total store expenses

4.1%

9.3%
2.4
0.8
1.4
1.7

15.6%
19.7%

Operating expense ratio

1.6

Net margin before taxes

Total economic cost of supermarket operation

21.3%

Based on data from Super Market Institute

to a plateau. Exhibit 1, above, pre
sents a modern supermarket’s fi
nancial profile.
Although widely used, margins
can be misleading. For instance,
even when a store’s gross margin
rises, the overall efficiency of total
distribution may improve. Here are
three realistic examples. One is
greater emphasis by supermarkets
on their own brands and on non
foods, often at a saving to the con
sumer. Another is backward inte
gration, netting lower total-channel
costs and, due to competitive pres
sures, lower prices. Finally, extra
operations and promotions that
consumers want boost a store’s
volume, entitling the retailer to
extra discounts from vendors. There
is no need to belabor the point that
rising margins do not always evi
dence a higher price level. But
often they do. Rising margins in
food retailing largely reflect in
creases in the number of stores,
increases in services, and increases
in complexity.
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The consumerist who condemns
the rising margin of supermarkets
ignores the fact that originally they
operated out of abandoned garages
at the outskirts of town. Goods
were displayed on old ginger-ale
cases. In due course, consumers
took convenient locations, wide
aisles, and ever increasing assort
ments on suitable fixtures for
granted.
Prosperous conditions after World
World War II favored an improved
store atmosphere through air-con
ditioning, music, rest rooms, special
lighting effects, carpets, murals, and
automatic doors. Supermarkets also
had to invest in equipment for meat
and frozen foods and in other new
technology.
Customers
demanded larger
parking spaces, longer store hours,
additional checkout and express
lanes—plus check-cashing, parcel
pickup stations, and free deliveries
to their cars. Supermarkets even
reverted to clerk-attended bakery
and delicatessen departments which
became quite popular. The newer,
larger units have prescription-drug
departments manned by profession
al pharmacists.
Usually such additions are sound
tactics in the short run. They give
the originator in each area a com
petitive advantage which increases
his revenues and profits to the det
riment of his rivals. When the latter
match or surpass the extra services,
all are saddled with extra costs
and have no way of offsetting them
except through higher prices. Old

ginger-ale cases and quaint loca
tions do not attract the typical hur
ried shopper.
Furthermore, supermarkets are
changing in many ways that are
not evident to the consumer. There
is much experimenting with new
approaches to reducing theft, re
moving trash, changing stockroom
procedure, allocating various func
tions, and saving administrative ex
penses. The shopper sees simple
sameness; the manager acts in an
environment of rapid change.
The new complexities in modern
retailing separate it more and more
from the halcyon days of the small
proprietor; they push up gross mar

gins.
For example, nowadays more
than nine out of ten supermarkets
are part of an organization that
operates a central warehouse. But
this logistical improvement only ex
poses an administrative problem: in
most of these companies, buying,
warehousing, and distributing are
separate functions. Each pursues
different goals. Actually, super
markets may need even deeper
functional backward integration,
controlled through interconnected
computers.
Among other complications, the
top echelons in supermarket cor
porations evaluate 7,000 new pro
duct offerings and 10,000 new tiein promotions from manufacturers
and wholesalers per year, supervise
their own processing facilities, bar
gain with labor unions, conduct
location analyses, manage their real
estate, appraise opportunities for
diversification, consider feasibility
studies, raise capital, and administer
cash flows . . . and the expense of
performing these functions is ris
ing. So are property taxes and other
governmental levies.
Although other causes could be
cited, it is evident that since the
Great Depression a variety of
sources has forced a larger share
of the consumer’s food dollar into
defraying the cost of store opera
tion. High gross margins are a key
problem to the supermarket in
dustry because they make it vulner
able to a basically different type
Management Adviser

of low-margin enterprise. As ex
plained by Professor Malcolm P.
McNair in his “Wheel of Retailing”
concept, the newcomer undersells
the established retailers and wins
their customers. This is, of course,
exactly what the supermarket in
dustry did in its early years.
How serious is the problem of
record-high margins? The answer
is not clear-cut because published
series are not internally consistent
due to changes in definition, com
position of the sample, etc. But, ap
parently, supermarket chains re
quired a higher gross margin dur
ing the past decade than grocery
and meat chains in the 1920s.2
Certainly, it is clear that, from
both societal and commercial points
of view, the high cost of food dis
tribution signifies a need for man
agement advisers to develop a more
efficient system.
Statistics of Income, published
by the Internal Revenue Service,
show gross margins of the largest
retail food corporations as low as
14.8 per cent in 1941 and 1948. The
leading chain, A&P, was lower yet.
Gross profits in its fairly typical
Middle Western division were
13.5 per cent in 1941 and 12.6 per
cent in 1942, according to M. A.
Adelman’s landmark study of the
A&P. The 1967 U.S. Statistics of
Income puts gross margins of the
largest retail food corporations at
21.8 per cent. Studies of super
market expenses inaugurated dur
ing the past two decades similarly
show a rising trend. In OPS-con
trolled 1951 the median gross mar
gin reported by Super Market In
stitute was 16.0 per cent; in 1971 it
was 21.3 per cent for operators
with warehouse and 19.3 per cent
without. The operating expense
ratio may have climbed even more.
One soaring expense is the cost
of labor. This is important. On the
accompanying common-size state
ment, wages and supplemental ben
efits account for nearly one-half of
operating expenses. Another source,
Progressive Grocer magazine, puts
2 Federal Trade Commission, Chain
Stores, 1933. See also annual reports of
individual companies.
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payroll expense of chain stores at
above 11 per cent. Both studies
agree that the proportion of labor
costs is rising. The potential for
cost escalation is high because most
wage rates in retailing are still low.
Unionization is increasing. Some
scarce skills like meat-cutting al
ready command very high rates.
Many managements have surren
dered the flexibility of rotating
store employees between stockroom, sales floor, and checkout.
Some unions are opposing such
changes as moving in-store meat
cutting to a more efficient and
sanitary centralized operation.
Productivity crisis

In recent years, real output per
manhour has declined. Prior in
creases in productivity were out
stripped by higher hourly labor
costs almost 1:4. “The retail food
industry is faced with a major pro
ductivity crisis,” declared Dr. Gor
don F. Bloom, former chairman of
the National Association of Food
Chains. “It is sobering to consider
that in the entire period from 1929
to 1958, which was marked by one
of the most revolutionary changes
in the long history of food distri
bution—the transition from service
to self-service stores—the rate of
improvement in manhour output in
good wholesaling and retailing
averaged only 1.8 per cent per
annum.”
At present, many in the food in
dustry bank on breakthroughs in
mechanization and automation.
They are working on a ten-digit
universal product code which will
give almost every American grocery
product—some 900,000 items—its
own identification number. The
code will be readable by either a
person or a scanning device. The
concept is similar to the magnetic
ink character recognition on checks
and the expected benefits are sim
ilar. The ultimate goal is to make
automatic checkout operational.
Since these plans push the state of
the art, management advisers are
needed in all phases. Not only do
companies require new software

and operating systems, individual
ized procedures and trained person
nel, but projects are even hampered
by such questions as, whose equip
ment should we buy?
Along with mechanization, the
industry’s hope for resolution of
its “productivity crisis” may be new
personnel programs with two-step
objectives. First is a reduction in
costly turnover. Part-time employ
ees outnumber full-time 7:5; more
than 100 per cent of the part-time
and one-third of the full-time help
are separated annually. Second, as
employees’ tenure lengthens, more
training to improve performance
and operate new equipment is
practicable. The entire spectrum of
personnel utilization and manage
ment offers many opportunities for
consultants. Finding ways to cut
payroll 10 per cent can boost the
bottom line by one-third. How
many other industries offer such
an incentive to efficiency?
Dr. Willard R. Bishop, Jr., direc
tor of research for Super Market
Institute, points to the need for
more serviceable two-way com
munication between warehouse and
stores as one reason for locating
some computer facilities in the
latter. In turn, store managers and
their assistants will have to learn
to run this equipment and to inter
pret the printouts. “As labor cost
increases, management will be even
more willing to spend money on
programs that are designed to im
prove labor scheduling, increase
labor productivity, and substitute
equipment for labor.” But Bishop
also cautions that further deperson
alization of a supermarket might
alienate shoppers.
After all, the mission of super
markets is not to minimize costs.
It is to promote purchases on their
premises of foods and related
staples at competitive prices, and
with the shopping comforts that
consumers want. What are some
typical merchandising practices in
the supermarket industry? Profit is
the incentive for these efforts. How
do companies foster patronage of
their stores? Another question, much
in the news in the spring of 1972,
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involves their pricing. A few im
portant aspects of each will now
be analyzed, beginning with mer
chandising.
Merchandising

A typical supermarket displays
8,000 items. The grocery depart
ment accounts for 67.7 per cent
of total revenue, meat 25.0 per
cent, and produce 7.3 per cent.
Product mix varies among stores
mainly according to consumer pref
erence. Supermarkets have relative
ly little latitude and profit poten
tial in deviating from the wanted
combination. Instead, manage
ment’s discretion lies in policies on
nonfoods, proprietary brands, de
ployment of shelf space, and add
drop decisions.
The grocery department handles
dry packaged-goods food, dairy,
and nonfoods. The latter include
health and beauty aids, hardware,
phonograph records, and so on.
These have higher margins but
lower turnover than foods. Origin
ally hailed as profit restorers, non
foods have leveled off at a dis
appointing 6.1 per cent of sales.
Due to the diversity and complex
ity of these lines, they are often
handled by rack jobbers. These
specialized middlemen assume re
sponsibility for the buying, de
livery, display, pricing, and pointof-sale advertising of nonfoods —
and the liquidation of poor sellers.
Supermarkets have vacillated be
tween delegating these functions
or performing them themselves. In
general, arrangements with rack
jobbers have the same advantages
and disadvantages for supermarkets
as leased departments have for
general-merchandise stores.
A more critical merchandising
policy is the use of resellers’
brands. Shoppers do not know
whether a product that, except for
its “private label” and lower price,
looks similar to a well-liked manu
facturer’s brand, is in fact iden
tical or not. Indeed, many resellers’
brands come from the same source
as their heavily advertised brethren,
but some emanate from indepen
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dent plants with deficient sanitary
control. Under the prodding of
consumerists, retailers are increas
ing the surveillance of their vendors
(as well as their own premises).
A proprietary-brand program is
by no means an easy task. After
defining the product, the reseller
must pay for design of separate
labels, unique packaging, segre
gated inventory, and special stock
control. Once a retailer’s name ap
pears on the package, the product
is unsalable in other outlets. Since
the shelf life of food is limited,
such an operation is economical
mainly for a large organization. As
in the case of nonfoods, specialized
middlemen have sprung up to serv
ice supermarkets.
Shoppers loyal to store brands

The main purpose of food chains
in establishing their own brands,
The National Commission on Food
Marketing found, is to cultivate
shoppers’ loyalty to a line of exclu
sive products. They are potentially
lucrative; merchandise costs and
advertising for resellers’ brands are
relatively low. But many super
markets shelve their own brands at
the most desirable place (eye level),
sell them at a lower price, yet ex
perience lower turnover than for
manufacturers’ brands. Many em
bark on this course because their
competitors have developed propri
etary brands. Some seek indepen
dence from manufacturers whose
brands are strongly entrenched.
Another objective is greater free
dom in cost and pricing than vari
ous laws permit for generally avail
able goods.
Merchandising policies vary.
Some retailers use a large number
of proprietary names for different
product classes, qualities, etc. Some
concentrate on a limited number of
brands. Some emphasize their own,
but many do not. It is clear, how
ever, that the battle of the brands
has intensified vendor’s rivalry for
shelf space. Payment for exposure
is not uncommon. There have even
been occasional instances of vio
lence.

Almost two out of ten grocery
items are displaced every year. A
typical supermarket adds about 900
new products and drops 700. To
screen the flood of new offerings,
over one-third of the companies use
formal buying committees. A study
of buying committees by A. C.
Nielsen Co., the research house,
found that their criteria rank as
follows:
1. Evidence of consumer
acceptance
2. Advertising and sales
promotion support
3. Introductory terms and
allowances
4. Logic behind developing
the product
5. Recommendations for
merchandising.
But other observers feel that most
of these committees tend to en
dorse the judgment of the product
buyer and their main contribution
is to let him reject six out of seven
proposals gracefully.
In general, the merchandising
function seeks to satisfy customers,
making total cubic footage of space
as productive as possible. Store
managers’ decisions on shelf space
and displays can have a major and
immediate effect on sales. But the
managers have little research or
few plain operating facts to guide
these decisions. In most organiza
tions, Progressive Grocer found,
computers spew out too many re
ports for executives at headquarters
and too few for executives at the
store.
Some companies are installing
new procedures to stock ever more
closely to consumer demand. A rou
tine which replenishes on the basis
of bimonthly sales is unworkable
for goods with fluctuating popular
ity. Not too long ago, supermarkets
overbought at the end of each prod
uct’s season. Then the product’s
low volume caused an insufficiency
in stock long after consumer de
mand had resumed.
Supermarkets need better infor
mation on shopping patterns and
current preferences to gauge sales
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opportunities for their thousands of
products and brands. In addition,
daily summaries of product move
ment and open-to-buy could im
prove service levels as well as prob
lem cognizance. And, since sales
respond quickly to advertising and
sales promotion, such statistics can
also guide supermarket operators
to more effective promotional
tactics.
Promotion

Four out of five shoppers read
food store advertisements or hand
bills regularly, and most compare
prices of two or more supermar
kets, according to annual surveys
by Burgoyne, Inc., the marketing
research specialist. These consum
ers visit two supermarkets weekly,
on average. During a typical
month, the majority shop in three
stores or more. Apparently, super
market advertising performs a sig
nificant informative task for con
sumers.
It also is of critical importance
to each store because fluctuations
in patronage exert a substantial lev
erage on net profit. Store location
and size circumscribe largely the
range of profitability, the McKin
sey-General Foods study discov
ered, but a manager can vary the
net 75 per cent through a 20 per
cent change in volume. No wonder
supermarkets put heavy emphasis
on promotion. Besides advertising
in all media, supermarkets use
giveaways, banners, public-ad
dress systems, and special displays.
The practice of giving premiums
to induce patronage of food stores
antedates the Civil War. “The
most important psychological and
economic fact in premium-giving is
that it diverts the buyer’s attention
from the thing being bought to the
thing which is being given,” Lever
ett S. Lyon explained in an analysis
published by the Brookings Insti
tution.
In the 1950s the ideal method of
fastening consumer allegiance to a
particular supermarket was the
trading stamp, which retailers have
used on and off since before the
turn of the century. Most stamp
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plans give supermarkets local ex
clusivities; since brands are not in
terchangeable, stamp savers return
to the same store because spaces
in their booklet are empty. Just
about everybody did save. Super
markets with an exclusive stamp
brand had at last a commercially
significant device which—unlike
shopping comforts or price cuts—
distinguished them and could not
be imitated.
Almost every major food chain
fought bitterly to escape what most
retailers regard as an albatross. “We
fought them by cutting prices; we
gave away hosiery, dishes, and
dolls. We used every gimmick
known—and still the stamp stores
took sales away from us. We could
n’t fight them, so we joined them,”
declared the president of The Kro
ger Co., now owner of the coun
try’s number two stamp, Top Val
ue. In California several leading
retailers even organized a nonfran
chise stamp plan, allegedly for the
purpose of destroying the stamp
system,3 but the results were per
verse. Although confined to Cali
fornia, this brand (Blue Chip) be
came the third largest in the
country.
By 1961 stamp usage peaked at
78 per cent of all supermarkets.
Many felt that availability of dif
ferent brands and the rate of dis
bursement were excessive. In fact,
the stamp industry’s leader—S & H
—tried to confine its franchises to a
standard rate of one stamp per
ten-cent sale. Some Government
officials, retailing spokesmen, and
social critics kept up a running bar
rage against stamps, promising that
discontinuance would shrink prices.
Outside California elimination of
trading stamps has proceeded apace
since 1966; presumably shoppers
who no longer receive them are
still waiting for prices to taper off.
Members of the Super Market In
stitute say that in 1972 their stamp
usage will plummet to 20 per cent.
In many supermarkets, stamps

Supermarkets need better

information on shopping
patterns and current

preferences to gauge

sales opportunities for their
thousands of products and

brands. In addition daily
summaries of product

movement and open-to-buy
could improve service
levels as well as problem

cognizance . . .

3 “Blue Chip Stamp Co. Consent Judg
ment Approved by Court,” The Wall
Street Journal, June 7, 1967, p. 22.
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Any traditional markup analysis misclassified some goods as highly profitable . . .

were succeeded briefly by pro
motional games some of which
were rigged, it was asserted in
hearings before a subcommittee of
the U.S. House of Representatives.4
Subsequently the Federal Trade
Commission adopted regulations
aimed at ending these deceptions.
Joint promotions

A more enduring promotional
practice in the food trade is joint
promotions with suppliers. Most of
these are an allowance per case to
defray a portion of retail adver
tising expense for the manufactur
er’s goods. About one-third of all
offers are accepted, the U.S. De
partment of Agriculture found in a
study of 100 major food retailers.
One reason for wide usage of this
“cooperative advertising” is that
space costs of most newspapers are
much lower to local merchants than
to national manufacturers. There
have been numerous abuses such
as illegal discrimination by manu
facturers. and fraudulent claims by
retailers. These problems, too, have
provoked action by the FTC.
Another problem in joint pro
motions is the heavy incidence of
waste among the point-of-sale ma
terials with which manufacturers
deluge food stores. Arriving unsoli
cited, many are difficult to erect
and unsuitable for the recipient.
Somehow, he must get rid of the
unwanted display pieces. The
successful displays, however, can
double or triple a brand’s daily
sales volume. Perhaps the main
complaint about short-term promo
tions is that they disturb normal
sales patterns. When heavy buying
during a short period is offset by
subsequent slack, everybody from
manufacturer to consumer experi
ences some costly disruptions.
Altogether, supermarkets are un
4 Subcommittee on Regulatory Agencies,
1968.
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der daily pressure to stimulate sales.
The average transaction still is only
$6.50. It takes a lot of customers
to accumulate sufficient volume.
Traditionally, a convenient loca
tion, an attractive store, and a
desirable selection of groceries and
produce have been important shop
ping criteria. They still are influ
ential, but their relative importance
has declined, partly because so
many supermarkets seem alike. Of
greater influence on consumers in
the early ’70s is fresh meat of
high quality and—particularly—low
prices. Hence each management
emphasizes tactics which give an
appearance of spectacular savings.
Pricing

To set prices on many thousands
of items, in stores of various sizes
and with different competitive en
vironments, and under constantly
changing demand and supply con
ditions, is a very difficult task.
Many observers have criticized the
unscientific methods that super
markets employ. Some researchers
have noted widespread recourse to
rules of thumb, such as vary mark
up inversely with cost or volume,
charge per square foot or cubic
foot, sell a few leaders near cost,
etc. At least one investigator of this
arcane art concluded that prices
seem to result from random pro
cesses.
The main problem may be that
dealers do not know their products’
handling costs. A functional analy
sis by McKinsey & Co. showed that
any traditional markup formula
misclassified some goods as highly
profitable, whereas they really re
sulted in losses when direct hand
ling costs were considered. This
appears to be an area in which a
team of accountants and merchan
dise experts can suggest material
improvements in a client’s profit
ability.
Most companies use separate

pricing routines for produce, meat,
and groceries. The greatest uni
formity in markup rate is in the
produce section, particularly on
merchandise subject to seasonal
fluctuations and quality differences
which hamper price comparisons
by consumers. Much variation re
mains, of course, based on custom,
pressure to move perishables, and
arbitrary decisions. As in all parts
of a supermarket, managers prefer
numbers ending in an odd digit
(like 29 cents) or multiples (two
bags for 89 cents).
Fresh meat, a case of joint vari
able cost, is priced mainly to ap
parent demand. The sales poten
tial for chuck and other popular
grades, priced below average cost,
determines the total quantity avail
able. Better cuts sell at higher
prices, often insulated from com
parisons because shoppers equate
a high price with high quality. In
general, supermarkets tend to place
a higher markup on items which
appeal to only a small segment of
their clientele.
The grocery department has the
greatest variation in markup rates
and techniques. Many chains use
zone pricing based on the inten
sity of competition in each area.
Nevertheless, chains are still rela
tively inflexible in the marketplace.
The administration of chains is
regionwide.
Uniform practices
throughout a zone facilitate con
trol of the stores. Moreover, chains
are a target for various state mini
mum-markup laws.
Independents, on the other hand,
tend to be more responsive to local
demand. Some use a competitor’s
price as a basis for matching, ex
ceeding, or cutting their prices,
according to basic policy. Others
ignore competition, instead taking
clues on appropriate merchandis
ing, promotional, and pricing tac
tics from their customers.
Most householders consider them-
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selves expert comparison shoppers,
but surveys have refuted this illu
sion over and over again. For ex
ample, consumers cannot name the
prices at which they last bought
their foods. Comparisons are un
believably complex. One researcher
needed 300 manhours to evaluate
the prices in eight stores, using
only 77 items. “Given complete
price information, the help of com
puters and all the clerical help
needed,” the National Commission
on Food Marketing conceded, “it
is impossible to say which retailer
in a particular community has
lower prices.”
Perhaps supermarkets have more
pricing freedom than some execu
tives surmise. A few companies re
tain home economists to help their
customers get the most food value
for their money; more companies
are expected to seek professional
advice on this subject. Studies re
veal that a low-price image attracts
—and holds—more customers than
low prices.
In recent years, as inflation ac
celerated and consumers’ price con
sciousness increased, many super
markets have shaped their strategy
around the concept of discounting.
The pioneers in each area achieved
substantial sales gains by a pro
gram involving the following ele
ments:
1. Drop shelf prices in the gro
cery department a discernable
rate—often, 7 per cent seemed
to be the threshold of percep
tion.
2. Feature “every day low
prices,” thereby eliminating week
end specials and saving the high
labor cost of changing prices.
3. Cut number of items from
8,000 to 6,500, reducing expenses
of inventory management and
logistics.
4. Discontinue stamps and
games.
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5. Shorten trading hours and re
duce services.
6. Increase advertising heavily,
to expand the trading area from
1.5 to 4 or 5 miles.
7. Plan on lower profit or incur
a loss for a period after the
change-over.
As competitors lost sales to the
discounters, they retaliated by
matching the price cuts, and vol
ume was once more redistributed
among the stores. It was also
learned that, while customers want
lower prices even if paired with
relinquishing stamps and games,
they insist on a wider selection of
merchandise, longer store hours,
speedier checkout, and other serv
ices. As a result of these reactions
from competitors and consumers,
the price differential between the
typical discount operation and con
ventional supermarket has shrunk
to about 2 per cent. Some com
panies offset reductions in grocery
prices by increases in meat. “Al
most three out of five discount
store shoppers think that discount
store prices are the same or higher
than other supermarkets’,” reports
Burgoyne, Inc.
Unit pricing

Another recent development is
pressure for unit pricing. This is
one of many expense-boosting re
forms that some consumerists ad
vocate. But the vast majority of
respondents to surveys on these is
sues express more concern for basic
operating and pricing practices.
Most people feel that supermarkets
reap enormous net profits on sales,
and that they can well afford to
slash prices. This high-profit, widelatitude image of the industry was
reinforced in April, 1972, when,
after a publicized conference with
the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury,
the presidents of some leading

supermarket chains announced sub
stantial price cuts on meat, suspen
sion of further price increases, etc.
A few others said nothing publicly.
Organisation

But the hope for lasting relief
from soaring costs and prices lies
largely outside the boundaries of
a store. “If we really want to make
possible large breakthroughs in
productivity in the food industry,”
explained Dr. Bloom, “we must look
at the movement of product from
manufacturer to consumer as one
system. . .”
Dependent on a cumbersome,
costly maze of distribution, unaffil
iated independent stores have been
squeezed down to a sales share of
8 per cent. The rest is divided
about equally between chains
(more than ten stores under com
mon ownership) and affiliated in
dependents (cooperative and vol
untary groups). The basic idea of
affiliation is to combine the flexi
bility of independence and the effi
ciency of bigness. Usually, the store
fronts of all members feature the
group’s name.
Under a cooperative plan like
Shop-Rite or Certified Grocers,
independent retailers establish a
central wholesaling resource. The
participants gain the advantages of
mass purchasing power, jointly
owned brand names, coordinated
promotions, and feasibility of tele
vision advertising, streamlined data
processing, and other staff services.
The expense of this arrangement is
relatively low. Each member re
tains the freedom to buy from
other sources and to determine his
store’s other policies.
Voluntary groups are similar ar
rangements, but sponsored by an
independent wholesaler like Super
Valu or IGA. The sponsor’s margin
and obligations are set forth in a
contract. Since dealings are at
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arm’s length, the ties are often
looser than in a cooperative plan.
In either case, success depends
upon the leadership of the central
staff and the commitment of the
members. The participants’ auton
omy has handicapped some whole
saling facilities. At times, access to
capital has been difficult; invest
ment in processing machinery too
risky. But overall, the cooperative
and voluntary forms of organization
have enabled many thousands of
merchants to survive and prosper.
In the 70s, emphasis in realign
ments has shifted from corporate
to functional. Striving to improve
their efficiency, supermarket organ
izations are exploring new ways of
combining the activities of various
departments. One aim is to curtail
or eliminate multiple handling, de
lays, and errors. Often, this leads
to mechanization of manual tasks.
Usage of computers is expanding
fom record keeping routines to
aids for operational and planning
decisions. How should communica
tions and physical distribution be
coordinated? Can unusual sizes
and slow-moving items be rele
gated to regional warehouses with
parallel intercompany information
exchanges? These are new frontiers
for company managements; systems
experts are needed to help solve
these problems.
Retailing will always offer op
portunities for an innovator with
the right market timing or for an
entrepreneur with a streak of luck.
During recent years various kinds
of small food shops have become
popular. One example is a rapid
buildup of convenience stores fea
turing some 3,200 items such as
beer, soft drinks, bread, and milk,
in 2,400 square feet of space. The
gross margin of convenience stores
averages from five points above the
supermarket. Operated on a selfservice basis, convenience stores
are open until very late at night.
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Of the more than 16,000 conven
ience stores in mid-1972, one quar
ter are on a franchise basis. Pre
dicts food retailing authority Wil
liam Applebaum, “The majority of
small food stores will give way to
streamlined neighborhood conve
nience markets which, by staying
open long hours, will provide extra
time convenience.” Others note a
new trend toward small specialty
stores that cater to consumer seg
ments who buy geriatric, ethnic,
exotic, gourmet, frozen, organic,
natural, or other distinctive foods.
Most experts agree that a fully
automated store or centralized sup
ply center for home deliveries
based on television advertising and
telephone orders will not be opera
tional soon.
Conclusion

In the early 1970s all institutions
are under attack; the supermarket
industry is no exception. Its rec
ord-high gross margins make the
industry vulnerable to social critics
and to radically new forms of re
tailing. Paradoxically, its recordlow net margins limit its ability to
respond. Any relatively minor
change jeopardizes the net or, at
least, makes it swing wildly.
A review of supermarket mer
chandising, promotion, and pricing
shows that most managements con
tinue or extend the tactics that
have made the industry great. Over
the years the operators have done
a magnificent job in making good
food inexpensively available for the
American household. The super
market method of operation is in
deed the envy of the world. In
some foreign countries it is serving
as a model of progress. Much of
the supermarket industry’s past
success is attributable to pragmatic
executives with a healthy distrust
of intricate models that are built
on unrealistic assumptions.

Yet it is significant, perhaps, that
in America the top retailers outside
the food trade have moved to in
stall a different kind of manage
ment-even at a diminished empha
sis on operating experience. This
can be very dangerous, of course,
if overdone. But in coming years
the supermarket industry faces var
ious conversions to sophisticated
technology, and it needs manage
ments that are receptive to staff
men who advocate radically new
approaches, conduct technical and
financial feasibility studies, and in
stall new procedures. It needs man
agements who have enough confi
dence and knowledge to tolerate
occasional mistakes by the recent
college graduate who lacks first
hand familiarity with wresting an
other cent through meat-trimming
techniques but offers various an
alytical tools.
Supermarkets will confront and
weather the mounting challenges.
Since ultimate power resides in
public opinion, the industry must
get the facts across. But the indus
try cannot triumph if it blames
labor unions, consumerists, trading
stamps, and other proliferating vex
ations. Perhaps the turn of the
Wheel of Retailing is best made
evident through an article in the
September, 1969, issue of Progres
sive Grocer entitled, “How King
Kullen Went Stampless. . . . And
Loved It.” Actually, the article had
relatively little to say about stamps
which were discontinued as a by
product of King Kullen’s new ob
jectives:
“1. More aggressive merchan
dising.
“2. Improve the relationship
with suppliers.
“3. Restructure internal man
agement.”
Evidently, the supermarket industry
is changing to a systems approach.
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